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Chairman’s summing-up 
Michael Emerson
1 
his 31
st session of the European Security Forum on the strategic consequences of the global 
economic and financial crisis took place on 20 February 2009, at a time when the crisis seemed 
still to be deepening. The graphs of industrial production and global trade looked as if the 
world economy had fallen off a cliff, without showing any signs of hitting bottom. The losses of 
output and trade had not yet reached 1930s proportions, but they were already way beyond any post-
World War II experience in terms of gravity. No member of the panel claimed to know what was 
going to happen next: no-one volunteered to forecast the timing of a rebound, or to predict a sharp 
rebound versus a decade long (Japanese style) stagnation.  
Brad Setser of the Council for Foreign Relations, New York, underlined the gravity of the current 
crisis, with annualized data for the fourth quarter of 2008 pointing to huge output losses for industrial 
production and trade, most of all in Asian economies heavily dependent on exports. As the crisis 
passed on from the localised US sub-prime affair of 2007 into the global crisis of 2008, new financial 
vulnerabilities have emerged, especially at the level of Chinese financing of US deficits, now running 
at the unsustainable pace of about $400 billion a quarter. Chinese official investors are now giving 
priority to the comparative security of US Treasury paper, after painful experiments at investment in 
riskier assets. This has boosted the dollar exchange rate, but leaves the US strategically exposed to 
funding by non-democratic states (Gulf as well as China). Setser called this a dangerous game. The 
ideal scenario is for the US-Chinese current account imbalance to get onto a glide path towards 
reducing deficit and reliance on Chinese funding, but there was no sign of this happening.  
For his part Lanxin Xiang of the Graduate Institute, Geneva and Fudan University, Shanghai, 
advocated a massive shift in Chinese economic policy, away from excessive export dependency and 
into social welfare and education programmes, which he called Chinese Keynsianism. If this was 
accompanied by dissaving by the government (i.e. deficit spending) it could indeed cut the current 
account surplus and get away from the huge and wasteful investment in US Treasury assets. However, 
there was no assurance that this was going to happen on a scale sufficient to set the US-China 
imbalance on a correction course.  
Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, characterised the Russian situation now as 
having shifted from the past decade of ‘automatic growth’ to a new period of ‘automatic decline’. 
With the rise of oil and other commodity prices the Russian economy could not but grow, and now 
there was nothing that could prevent a very painful period. However, he portrayed Russian society as 
being adaptable in the sense of being able to endure hard times. So far the authorities had been 
reasonably successful in keeping to a stable path tactically, e.g. with a smooth and controlled 
depreciation of the ruble. However he speculated that the present tandem leadership would be under 
strain, with a possible shift of power to the Kremlin. Russia’s foreign policy priorities would become 
more constrained, with less priority for initiatives in distant places (e.g. Latin America), but new 
opportunities in the former Soviet space, as these countries were coming to Moscow for economic aid, 
which no-one else seemed willing to supply.  
Richard Youngs, of FRIDE and CEPS, saw the crisis accentuating the trend in EU foreign policy, 
which he characterised as pulling back from the serious promotion of a liberal democratic order. This 
had the effect of sacrificing the EU’s comparative advantage as a global actor. The pressures for 
protectionism were evident, but not yet amounting to a qualitative change. He saw the emerging multi-
polar world in increasingly Hobbesian terms, but raised questions nonetheless over how non-
democratic regimes would fare in the adequacy of their responses to the crisis. An EU official 
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remarked that ‘maybe’ Youngs was right in detecting a retreat from liberal cosmopolitanism, but noted 
that Europe’s political values were very deeply rooted.  
The deteriorating situation in Eastern Europe was described by a Commission economist. This was not 
just the shock impact of the global financial crisis. The transition indicators of the EBRD had been 
stagnant now for several years, and notably so for Ukraine. “Back to basics” was his message, i.e. an 
inevitable need to revert to hard adjustment policies. The emergence of Russia as supplier of financial 
aid to several CIS countries including Ukraine meant that there was a new case for the coordination of 
EU policies in the region with those of Russia, as well as with the IMF, for which there is already 
experience to build on. This remark met with the agreement of the Russian diplomat, remarking that 
there is the need now for frank discussions over our goals for the region, and over what to do together, 
rather than acting in a competitive mode. The chair remarked that this would be quite a revolutionary 
prospect, but one to be greatly welcomed.  
In discussion over the possible political impact of the crisis on the world, Youngs’ supposition was 
that it would be bad news for fragile democracies, and would push authoritarian regimes into more 
repressive measures. This argument was met with sceptical comments from Lukyanov and Xiang. For 
Lukyanov Russia’s failed democracy would continue to navigate between semi-authoritarianism and 
semi-democracy. For Xiang China had its own system, with its own logic. Whether or not Western 
democracy was better placed to face up to the crisis, he was not sure.  
A number of more specific themes were touched upon. A discussant on the social consequences 
contrasted the situation at least in Europe with that of the 1930s. Today’s advanced social security 
regimes and large public sectors ensured that powerful automatic stabilisers would be activated. 
Nonetheless large differences in labour market flexibility between European countries would see mean 
difficult adjustments in the most rigid of regimes, versus more organic adjustments to follow naturally 
in the more flexible regimes.  
The structure of the presentations and debates came to take on a certain shape: one of different 
combinations of pairs among the four actors under consideration: the US-Chinese pair locked in a 
uniquely important but dangerous financial interdependence; the EU-Russia pair due perhaps to 
become more cooperative together with shared concerns for their common neighbourhood; and the 
EU-US democrats compared to the Chinese-Russian (semi-) autocrats now engaged in testing which 
regimes will prove best able to handle the crisis.   
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How will the financial crisis affect 
EU foreign policy?
1 
Richard Youngs
2 
ttention is beginning to turn to the broader political impact of the financial crisis. The question 
arises of whether the crisis will affect the EU’s broader foreign policies – and if so, how. 
On this a degree of consensus is evident in commentators’ preliminary musings. Many voices are 
already suggesting that the crisis is likely to mark a turning point in international relations of the same 
magnitude as those produced by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the attacks of 9/11. Many predict a 
weakening of support for economic liberalism beyond the immediate banking crisis. And many also 
foresee the crisis triggering a fundamental shift in the global balance of power and even infecting the 
liberal political values that ostensibly lie at the heart of European foreign policies. In short, the fear is 
taking hold that the financial crisis will undermine the principal tenets of Western-sponsored global 
liberalism and encourage a retrenchment in US and European diplomacy.  
With the situation still in flux, worst-case scenarios remain a distinct possibility. But it is more 
convincing for the present to caution against such apocalyptic reasoning.  
In this regard, two arguments are advanced here. First, the financial crisis is unlikely to represent a 
watershed moment for EU foreign policy. It is more likely simply to reinforce a number of trends 
already in train. Second, it would be wrong for the EU to respond to the crisis by withdrawing into 
itself and abandoning the cause of liberalism – in either its economic or political dimensions. To 
suggest that the crisis reflects an excess of political and economic liberalism is misleading and likely 
to result in damaging policy responses. The EU has been shifting away from liberal trade and foreign 
policies for a number of years. The crisis in part reflects such a trend, while also threatening to further 
tempt European governments away from cosmopolitan internationalism. This might seem an 
apparently paradoxical conclusion to draw at present, but one that would better safeguard long-term 
European interests.  
The fate of liberalism 
Some commentators have argued that the crisis risks undermining the whole appeal of free market 
capitalism. The EU’s international leverage is based in large measure on the ‘normative appeal’ of its 
own internal market. Surely, many suggest, that influence stands to diminish now as the crisis exposes 
the fallacies of ‘unfettered capitalism’. 
Yet it is important here to take a critical view of the hyperbole that has flooded press comment. The 
financial crisis is clearly a cataclysmic event. On some indictors it has surpassed the gravity of the 
1929 crash and has exposed the worst excesses of capitalism that have been allowed to flourish in 
recent years. It represents a serious case of market failure, asymmetrical regulation of different parts of 
the financial system and lax supervision having failed to forestall banks becoming massively over-
leveraged.  
Prior to the crisis economic policies were based on the West providing capital to emerging economies 
and supporting a liberal trading regime as a means of importing goods back into European markets. 
The whole geopolitical balance of this bargain has now shifted. The West is now set to export less 
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capital, while China’s unparalleled liquidity will enhance its power. It is argued that the ‘liberal 
equation’ has been undermined.
3 
But it is doubtful that recent events entail the kind of general crisis of liberal markets as suggested in 
particular by some French, German and Spanish ministers. Contrary to much media comment, the 
problem is not the wholesale spread of ‘unfettered markets’. Government accounts for more than twice 
the share of GDP than it did in 1929. European states all operate a mixed economy and will continue 
to do so.  
What has been striking is the lack of full European integration and transnational supervision in the 
financial sector. It is this that has produced responses geared towards protecting national markets 
rather than an overarching European plan – notwithstanding the loose coordination that has gradually 
taken shape at an inter-governmental level.  
Extracting the foreign policy implications from this understanding of the crisis requires a finer-grained 
understanding of recent trends in EU external policies. The very real risk is that a crisis rooted in the 
malgovernance of the financial sector will encourage European states to adopt a less liberal stance on 
external economic policies across the board – and that a wounded Europe will retreat into a new 
protectionism. 
To point out that the EU will now find it harder to sell a model based on the free market and 
governance standards outside its own borders misses a crucial fact: in recent years the EU has been 
circumspect in promoting such liberalism through its external trade anyway.  
The EU has already done more than its fair share to sink the Doha Round. It has ended its own 
moratorium on bilateral trade deals to pursue talks with important Asian economies to the detriment of 
its supposed commitment to the multilateral trading system. The EU is seen around the world as the 
worst culprit of intensified ‘standards protectionism’. For several years now the rhetoric of most EU 
ministers and commissioners has constantly stressed what there is to fear from globalisation more than 
the benefits that flow from it.  
While the EU has been criticised for imposing reciprocal market-opening on African states through 
new Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), it is also the case that member states have wrested 
control over EPA talks from the Commission’s trade directorate in order to inject a ‘development 
mandate’ and somewhat dilute liberalisation requirements placed on Cotonou partners. Indeed, most 
European donors still pursue a very statist model to development and post-conflict reconstruction. The 
EU has, of course, also baulked at extending EU membership. And its determination to spread 
standards of trade- and investment-related good governance has weakened.  
Curiously, continental European politicians have been far more vociferous in declaring that the 
financial crisis represents ‘a defeat for the market’ and liberal economics than has the Chinese 
Communist Party! 
It is too early to determine whether their will be a full-scale retreat into protectionism. But the early 
signs do not look good. Since the outbreak of the crisis European ministers have ritually promised that 
there will be no slide towards protectionism. The more ardently they state this, the more they 
contemplate just such measures.  
The trend is towards ‘protection lite’. The EU has not adopted out and out trade restrictions but a 
series of actions that militate against international interdependence. The EU reacted vigorously against 
the ‘Buy America’ campaign launched under the new Obama presidency, but several similar ‘buy 
national’ campaigns have been supported in Europe too. State aid rules have been relaxed. Financial 
bail-outs have gone hand in hand with governments encouraging banks to retreat into national 
markets. Some accuse the UK of letting the pound fall as a protectionist measure. France has offered 
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soft loans to companies on condition they use local suppliers. Gordon Brown lectures the world on the 
dangers of protectionism; but for one commentator the prime minister’s own inward-looking policies 
render him ‘hypocrite-in-chief’.
4 In the US Democrat free traders have refused to criticise the Buy 
America initiative in part because they insist that European procurement rules are still far more 
restrictive. Middle Eastern, Russian and African interlocutors have all ironically suggested to 
diplomats that the European spree of bank nationalisations mirrors the statist route for which the EU 
has for so long admonished developing countries.  
Member states such as Germany, France and Italy have introduced restrictions on Sovereign Wealth 
Funds. A new German law restricts access of foreign buyers, in particular big Chinese and Middle 
Eastern SWFs. President Sarkozy has moved ahead with creating a French fund explicitly to fend off 
such foreign ‘predators’. The so-called Santiago principles agreed in October 2008 to open up east-to-
west investment are now in doubt. EU populations now perceive open trade very much as a risk more 
than an opportunity. The rise of the Linke (leftist) party under Oscar Lafontaine in German polls is 
seen to be the result of its highly protectionist platform.  
Some have welcomed the prospect of a humbled Europe, in the midst of nationalising swathes of its 
own financial sector no longer being able to impose IMF-style structural adjustment on developing 
countries. But this caricatures the nature of EU external economic policies in recent years. EU policies 
still require greater finesse to ensure that developing states are helped into global markets in a way that 
does not undermine local wealth generation. But even before the crisis struck, the challenge was to 
turn Europe away from inward-looking market protection and self-interested mercantilism much more 
than it was to rein in any free-trade, structural-adjustment fervour. This challenge is likely to be 
magnified after the autumn of 2008.  
Contrary to the very thing it is supposed to excel at, the EU has failed to use a liberal concept of 
economic order as the basis for a strategy to support security objectives. In terms of the much-lauded 
(but confused) concept of EU ‘normative power’ one wonders how much there was to salvage from 
the wreckage of the 2008 financial crisis anyway.  
While the crisis entailed a major failure of market mechanisms, it should at its core be understood as a 
crisis of bad governance rather than one of market-capitalism per se. In this sense, whatever the 
shortcomings exposed in the US and European economies, governance problems remain much more 
serious outside the West. If the crisis does spread to Asian and other markets this is likely to become 
painfully apparent.  
The crisis may then help propel forward a broader and more assertive international focus on 
governance standards and regulations. The end result of the crisis may be to intensify pressure for 
international, and maybe even supranational, good governance regulations. This is precisely the EU’s 
supposed niche in international relations. It is where the EU can assist in both tempering the excesses 
of US deregulation and improving multilateral rules and governance. The crucial thing will be to 
ensure that such regulations work to facilitate, rather than restrict, global trade and investment.  
Power shifts 
A second widespread prediction is that the financial crisis will hammer the final nail into the coffin of 
the ‘unipolar moment’. For analysts who have long seen the liberal world order underpinned by US 
hegemony, this is seen as a harbinger of global instability. The journey from unipolarity to ‘balanced 
multipolarity’ will certainly be difficult to navigate without events leading the world into far less 
benign forms of ‘competitive multipolarity.’ And certainly not a voyage best undertaken in the current 
storm of panic and confusion.  
However, that the crisis will unleash such a fundamental shift in relative power is by no means certain. 
Few commentators have resisted the temptation to draw parallels with 1929 and its subsequent global 
                                                      
4 Martin Wolf, “Why Davos man is waiting for Obama to save him”, Financial Times, 4 February 2009, p. 11. 6 | RICHARD YOUNGS 
after-shocks. But for the current financial crisis to end up triggering serious international conflict the 
whole framework of collective security put in place since the 1940s would have to unravel. The 
cushioning effect of international institutions and cosmopolitan civic organisations simply did not 
exist to the same extent in the 1930s as today.  
It is by no means certain that European economies will emerge stronger from the crisis than the United 
States. The latter retains its higher productivity and innovation base. Speculation that the time is once 
more ripe for the EU to challenge US leadership looks premature. As always, any decline in US 
relative power is anyway a mix of both boon and bane for Europe: a relative gain vis-a-vis 
Washington can be off-set by accompanying US introversion in promoting a broad set of global liberal 
values. 
Conversely, it is not clear that the emerging powers will escape unscathed. Russia has been harder hit 
than any EU economy. Indeed it is ironic that the crisis has exposed underlying weaknesses in 
Russia’s economy and system of governance just as the EU was fretting over how to respond to the 
changed European security panorama ushered in by the August 2008 Georgia conflict. Once again, 
this has reinforced the fact that the balance between Russian assertiveness and Russian fragility is a 
fine one. Still, dealing with the post-Georgia scenario may remain a greater diplomatic challenge than 
anything thrown up by the financial crisis. In this sense the EU’s measures – a 500 million euro aid 
package to Georgia and a relatively weak monitoring mission – are no more than short term 
palliatives. In a situation where the EU’s model of ‘transformation through integration’ has so far 
failed, policy-makers are bereft of long-term solutions. The positive outcome would be that the 
financial crisis tempers Russian adventurism while also making clearer to EU governments that 
engagement with Moscow cannot be based only on traditional forms of geopolitical balancing devoid 
of any consideration of internal Russian problems.  
In general, while many have predicted a relative rise in power of resource-rich states, one of the 
casualties of the crisis has been the international oil price – at the time of writing this has halved since 
the crisis erupted. The Iranian economy is being hit hard, for example. It is true that several powers 
may feel emboldened in their dealings with what they perceive to be a weakened West; but they 
themselves may be left feeling chastened too. 
It seems likely that China will emerge a more powerful actor as a result of the crisis, by virtue of its 
financial assets and the fact that it was not responsible for the crisis. With the West hoping that China 
can re-inject liquidity back into the global economy, Beijing will likely demand a greater say in 
international financial institutions in return. But it also the case that Asia itself teeters on the brink. 
Regulatory structures were strengthened after this region’s 1997 financial crisis but experts have 
pointed to a decline in basic governance standards in several key Asian economies. As of this writing, 
the crisis seems to be arriving at China’s shores. This has added grist to the mill of those arguing that 
the sustainability of the ‘China model’ has begun to look increasingly questionable in recent years.  
There were already compelling reasons of enlightened self-interest for Europe to cede its over-
representation in international bodies before the crisis struck: if it does not emerging powers are 
increasingly likely to bypass such institutions. The new prominence of the G20 reflects a trend long in 
gestation.  
Some analysts have begun to go even further and suggest that a shift in international power will 
undermine not just economic liberalism but a broader set of liberal political values. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit has drawn attention to the prospects of the financial crisis undermining democracy 
and democracy promotion in many places of the world. In terms of Europe’s ‘soft power’ most 
commentators had already been making stark comments about the declining appeal of ‘Western’ 
democratic and human rights ideals. But the key will be how democracies deal with the crisis. If they 
succeed better than non-democratic states then pluralism’s appeal could actually rise. If they 
demonstrate that – in the spirit of Amryrta Sen – openness and robust democratic debate can help 
mitigate crises better than autocratic guidance it is not inevitable that the crisis will be entirely 
negative for democratisation.  HOW WILL THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AFFECT EU FOREIGN POLICY? | 7 
Resource diversion 
A final concern is that scarce resources will be shifted away from international priorities. 
The most obvious fear is that spending on development assistance could be an early casualty. Some 
EU member states are already intimating at cuts in the less high profile areas of aid priorities. Funding 
to help meet renewable energy targets already seems to be at risk. And money for inclusive migration 
policies could diminish, hand in hand with a rise in populist nationalism.  
But there are some reasons to hope this will not be the case across the board. Budgets for overseas 
development assistance (ODA) are a small percentage of the amounts of funding that European 
governments have found for their respective bail-out packages. Cutting back development aid would 
make little dent in newly-increased public debt levels, but would inflict a heavy political price on 
governments already under intense public scrutiny for having ‘bailed out the fat-cats’. The huge 
amounts of money that governments have spent on rescuing banks may even make them more 
vulnerable to public admonishment for any cuts in development aid. Most ODA is locked into multi-
annual budgets and oriented increasingly towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals in 
relation to which EU governments have made so many promises.  
It has often been noted that rich countries may look to increase ODA when their own economies are 
under stress. Internal crisis heightens the concern to temper instability in and migration from the 
developing world. The link between development and security has been placed at the centre of EU 
foreign policy; European policy-makers would lose considerable credibility were they to retract from 
such a logic precisely when its more effective implementation is required – precisely when, that is, 
such a forward-looking and holistic commitment to development presents itself as one necessary part 
of systemic stabilisation rather than, as realists would have it, a mere ‘feel-good luxury’.  
Defence spending would seem to be far more at risk. It is indeed reasonable to expect defence budgets 
to come under more intense pressure. Cutbacks are already on the cards in the UK. Defence budgets 
have conspicuously not been ring-fenced from cuts in the same way as health and social spending. 
From a liberal, Europeanist perspective this may be no bad thing. The new juncture may provide the 
much-needed prompt for EU member states to cut duplication and attain better value for money from 
their defence budgets. Most member states maintain huge numbers of soldiers in uniform that cannot 
be deployed and are completely useless for ‘fragile state’ type interventions. Now would be a good 
time to cut back waste and forge a more common and economical European defence architecture, 
better prepared to assist in peace support operations.  
Recuperation? 
None of this is to minimise the seriousness of the crisis or to ignore the fact that events could still take 
an even more catastrophic turn. But it is to invite consideration of a paradox: that the ultimate lessons 
for EU foreign policies could be the opposite of what it would currently seem most sensible to argue. 
It should be remembered that despite the crisis and need in specific parts of the financial sector for 
state intervention and better market regulation, overall European economies still require more market 
competition and international interdependence not less.  
The temptation to pull in the wrong direction will be strong. But the crisis may also provide a wake-up 
call. A wake-up call that Europe’s already-existing drift away from global (economic and political) 
liberalism is part of the problem not part of the solution. If development budgets do suffer this will 
certainly undermine Europe’s soft power, but here public pressure can help keep member states to 
their commitments. And while the crisis might tempt at least some member states into resisting any 
further EU enlargement even more fiercely, it could also raise the costs of ‘non-enlargement’ as 
European governments desperately seek out new market openings to recover growth.  
The crisis may even provide a positive service if it convinces the EU that simply declaring ad nauseam 
that Europe has a wonderfully successful and progressive model of ‘normative power’ no longer 
suffices when events increasingly reveal exactly the opposite to be true – and increasingly require real 
effort and conviction to ensure that liberal foreign policies regain some reality.   
8 | 
Strategic implications of the financial crisis 
Brad Setser
1 
hou Enlai’s famous response to a question about the impact of the French revolution – “It is too 
soon to tell” – is overused for a reason. It certainly applies to any attempt to assess the strategic 
impact of the financial crisis.  
The crisis has already been through two very distinct phases. The collapse in prices for complex 
‘structures’ in August 2007 (‘the subprime crisis’) was followed by a fall in private demand for US 
assets, a depreciation of the dollar, a surge in the price of oil, a surge in China’s reserves and an 
increase in the United States’ reliance on non-democratic governments for financing to support its 
still-large trade deficit. The US economy slowed, the world economy did not. The relative position of 
the US fell. The collapse of Lehman brothers – ‘the Lehman crisis’, though that seems too narrow to 
describe the ‘great unwind’ of financial leverage that followed – unleashed another phase of the crisis. 
It led to a huge surge in demand for US Treasuries from central banks and private banks alike, a rise in 
the dollar, a sharp fall in the price of oil and a reduction in US demand for the financial assets of the 
rest of the world. The US government shifted from borrowing from other central banks (through the 
sale of Treasury bonds) to lending to other central banks, as the Fed’s swap lines supplied scarce 
dollars to other central banks. The US economy fell into a recession, if not something rather worse. 
But European output is falling at a comparable pace. The fall in output now underway in Asia looks to 
be steeper than the fall that accompanied Asia’s own crisis.  
The crisis has dimmed the lustre of the US economic and financial model – no doubt a key part of the 
US soft power. The US financial system, until recently considered a model of sophistication, gave rise 
to a crisis that infected the world. The world’s willingness to adopt aspects of the US economic model 
has unquestionably declined. The United States itself is shying away from the stylised version of the 
US model. In other ways, though, the crisis has improved the relative position of the US: dramatic 
shifts in the global flow of funds and the fall in the price of oil – have worked to the advantage of the 
US, largely at the expense of the oil exporters. The United States’ external deficit is shrinking even as 
the world’s demand for dollars, at least temporarily, has increased. It now relies far less on non-
democratic governments for financing than it did 12 months ago. However, the crisis is sure to evolve. 
Its long-term strategic consequences will hinge on which country proves most able to pull itself out of 
the current, severe, global downturn, and whether it does so by drawing on its own resources or 
borrowing (demand as well as funds) from the rest of the world. 
This paper reviews the impact of the financial crisis on the strategic position of the US, Russia (and 
the Gulf), China and Europe. It is based on a key assumption: financial power tends to accrue to 
creditors not debtors and that thus relying on other countries’ governments for financing is a strategic 
vulnerability. Other prisms for analysing the strategic impact of the crisis would undoubtedly lead to 
different conclusions. The goal of this paper is to spur discussion of the strategic impact of the crisis, 
not to offer a comprehensive assessment. 
The United States 
The US entered the current crisis with two enormous financial vulnerabilities: a leveraged financial 
system that had little resilience against shocks and a larger external deficit than could be financed in 
the private market.  
The first vulnerability led directly to the current crisis. Poorly regulated banks, lightly regulated 
broker-dealers and the unregulated components of the shadow financial system all made an enormous, 
leveraged bet that the rise in US home prices would be sustained and large macroeconomic imbalances 
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were consistent with low levels of macroeconomic and financial volatility. When home prices started 
to fall, the combination of leverage and financial complexity proved lethal to most major financial 
institutions. Some institutions initially raised capital from private investors and – to a lesser degree – 
from the sovereign funds of non-democratic countries.
2 Over the course of 2008, though, it became 
clear that financial losses were growing not shrinking – and more and more financial institutions 
failed.  
An overleveraged financial system that lacked resilience in the face of shocks proved to be a larger 
risk to US taxpayers than to the strategic position of the US. The financial system will ultimately be 
recapitalised by the public purse, not by the wealth funds of non-democratic governments. The losses 
in the European and American financial system are now estimated to exceed the assets managed by the 
world’s sovereign funds.
3  
The second vulnerability posed larger long-term strategic risks. The gap between the United States’ 
need for external financing and private demand for US assets (private inflows, net of US purchases of 
foreign assets) was met largely by the purchase of US bonds by emerging market central banks. The 
sources of financing for the rise in the United States’ external deficit that accompanied the recovery 
from the 2000-01 recession consequently differed from the sources of financing for past rises in the 
US external deficit. In the early 80s, high US interest rates pulled in funds from Japan and Europe. In 
the latter half of the 1990s, the United States’ rising stock market pulled in funds from the world – 
including, after 1998, funds that previously had been flowing to an emerging Asia. For most of the 
2000s, though, returns on US financial assets lagged returns on non-American financial assets. Not 
surprisingly, (net) foreign demand for US financial assets from private investors was restrained.
4 
However, the enormous increase in the foreign exchange reserves held by the central banks of the 
world’s emerging economies – China in particular – provided the net inflow needed to support the US 
deficit. Asian economies that import oil were adding record sums to their reserves – largely because 
they sought to resist Asian market pressure for their currencies to appreciate against the dollar – at the 
same time that high oil prices were generating record growth in the reserves of the oil-exporting 
economies.  
This relationship had aspects of mutual dependence. Asian countries rely on the US to supply demand 
for their products as much as the US relies on Asian central banks for financing on terms that were not 
available in the market. The oil-exporters rely on the United States for demand for their crude oil – 
                                                      
2 Nearly all the investment in US and European financial institutions came from the Gulf, China and Singapore. 
But for every rule there is an exception: the Korean Investment Corporation (KIC) invested $2 billion in Merrill 
Lynch (now part of Bank of America). Korea now regrets that investment: not only did it take large losses, but it 
also turned out to have a larger need for liquid financial assets than it anticipated when it set up the KIC. 
3 A related issue is whether relying on the sovereign funds of non-democratic countries to provide the capital for 
a large share of the financial system poses strategic risks. Hillary Clinton’s comment about China “It is hard to 
enforce your trade law against your banker” presumably applies to the folks who own your bank too. Democratic 
change in autocratic states with large investments in the US could potentially jeopardise US financial stability; it 
isn’t clear, for example, if a democratic Saudi Arabia would be willing to continue to hold most of its reserves in 
dollars. The current head of the national economic Council, Lawrence Summers, has highlighted another risk, 
namely that investments in regulated banks by foreign governments would necessarily turn a banking crisis into 
a foreign policy crisis. The decision to shut down an insolvent bank and wipe out its equity – including the 
equity of a sovereign fund – could easily be perceived abroad as the confiscation of its investment. 
4 For a time, the expansion of the shadow financial system – which operated offshore – masked the absence of 
private demand for US financial assets. The shadow financial system led to a huge increase in gross flows, as 
vehicles legally domiciled in London (and European banks) issued short-term dollar debt to US money market 
funds to finance the purchase of longer-dated US asset backed securities. This led to matched inflows and 
outflows, leading gross flows to increase. However, such matched flows couldn’t meet the financing need 
associated with the US current account deficit, which required a net build-up of foreign claims on the US. The 
shadow financial system took the credit risk associated with lending to risky US borrowers, but not the currency 
risks associated with lending to the US.  10 | BRAD SETSER 
and in some cases protection – as much as the US relies on the oil-exporters for financing. Any sudden 
interruption in the relationship would have damaged the economies of both the borrower and the 
lender. But the persistence of large deficits financed by the build-up of reserves implied growing 
underlying risks – and a large build-up of US treasury and agency bonds in the hands of foreign 
central banks. 
The cheap financing from central bank reserves classically has been viewed as a ‘good thing’ – and as 
a source of national power. The ability to borrow allows countries to spread costs – including the costs 
of wars – over time. As long as other countries could not reduce their dollar reserves without risking 
their own financial stability, it was hard for any country to translate its dollar holdings into leverage 
over US policy. The asymmetries in this relationship though were changing. Key countries – notably 
China – built up dollar reserves well in excess of what they needed to guarantee their own financial 
stability. The US increasingly risked finding itself in a position where it needed central banks around 
the world to add to their reserves more than the central banks actually needed more reserves.  
Of course, no country with a large current account surplus that is adding to its reserves rapidly could 
stop doing so without risking its own exports. As a result, the US increasingly relied on the desire of 
other countries to support their own exports – not the intrinsic appeal of US financial assets – to offset 
its low savings rate. The current head of the national economic council, Lawrence Summers, referred 
to this relationship as the “balance of financial terror” back in 2004. Summers’ analogy to the balance 
of nuclear terror implicitly raises the question of whether the United States reliance on other countries 
government for financing posed a strategic threat. Even if other countries could not cut the United 
States off without risking their own economies, awareness of its need for financing could constrain the 
United States’ policy choices.  
The strategic impact of other countries’ surplus reserves could express itself in other ways as well. The 
availability of alternative sources of large quantities of dollar financing could reduce the United 
States’ ability to use other countries’ need for dollars in a crisis as a strategic tool. Countries with large 
quantities of reserves have more strategic freedom of action; they are less likely to be deterred from 
taking geostrategic risks by the possibility that their actions could precipitate a financial crisis.  
The United States’ strategic and financial vulnerability increased after the price of securities 
constructed from subprime mortgages collapsed in August 2007. The dollar had been moving down 
against the euro over the course of 2006, as initial downturn in residential investment pulled down US 
growth. After a brief rally as European institutions scrambled to find dollars to repay their dollar debt, 
the dollar’s fall accelerated in autumn 2007. Moreover, the dollar’s fall against the euro was simply 
the most visible manifestation of a broader decline in foreign willingness to hold US financial assets – 
and a rise in US demand for foreign financial assets. The US economy – but not the world economy – 
slowed, and private capital moved from the stagnant US to the fast growing parts of the world. Asian 
reserve growth soared, as central banks in all emerging Asian economies – not just China – added 
huge sums to their reserves to keep the dollar from falling against their currencies. At the same time, 
high oil prices pushed up the growth in the foreign exchange reserves of many oil exporters – and 
allowed others to transfer large sums to their sovereign funds. Emerging markets that kept their 
currencies pegged to the dollar encouraged this flow, as private investors started to bet that a host of 
fast growing economies would eventually allow their currencies to rise. Countries that pegged to the 
dollar were importing loose monetary policy from the US at a point in time when their economies 
were generally doing well. The predictable result: an uptick in inflation in the emerging world.  
During this period, the US external deficit fell as a share of US GDP, but not in nominal terms. And 
the US increasingly relied on central banks to make up for a shortfall of private demand for US assets. 
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more-heavily on emerging market governments for financing. Niall Ferguson wrote in the Financial 
Times:
5 
We are indeed living through a global shift in the balance of power very similar to that which 
occurred in the 1870s. This is the story of how an over-extended empire sought to cope with 
an external debt crisis by selling off revenue streams to foreign investors. The empire that 
suffered these setbacks in the 1870s was the Ottoman Empire. Today it is the US. …. The US 
debt crisis has taken a different form, to be sure. External liabilities have been run up by a 
combination of government and household dissaving. It is not the public sector that is 
defaulting but subprime mortgage borrowers. As in the 1870s, though, the upshot of this debt 
crisis is the sale of assets and revenue streams to foreign creditors. This time, however, 
creditors are buying bank shares not canal shares. And the resulting shift of power is from 
west to east. 
In other words, as in the 1870s the balance of financial power is shifting. Then, the move was 
from the ancient oriental empires (not only the Ottoman but also the Persian and Chinese) to 
Western Europe. Today the shift is from the US - and other western financial centres - to the 
autocracies of the Middle East and East Asia. 
…. It remains to be seen how quickly today's financial shift will be followed by a comparable 
geopolitical shift in favour of the new export and energy empires of the east. Suffice to say 
that the historical analogy does not bode well for America's quasi-imperial network of bases 
and allies across the Middle East and Asia. Debtor empires sooner or later have to do more 
than just sell shares to satisfy their creditors. 
The intensification of the financial crisis that followed Lehman’s default brought this unstable 
equilibrium to an end. It did not end though with a fall in demand for US financial assets from 
emerging market central banks and a dollar crisis. Rather it ended with a huge contraction in US 
demand for foreign financial assets – and a rise in demand for safe dollar assets from borrowers 
abroad who had large dollar liabilities. As the entire global economy slowed, private money was 
withdrawn in mass from the emerging world. Bets against the dollar were unwound. Foreign demand 
for US financial assets didn’t really rise – no one wanted toxic US assets. Private capital flows started 
to contract – but they contracted in a way that increased (net) demand for dollars. Americans sold 
foreign assets and called their loans to Europe’s banks faster than private investors abroad sold their 
US assets. This shift, combined with the fall in oil prices that brought the United States’ external 
deficit down, dramatically reduced the United States reliance on foreign governments for financing. 
Indeed, the basic pattern of the past six years fully reversed itself in the second half of 2008. A 
shortfall in private demand for US financial assets gave way to a shortage of dollars in Europe and 
many emerging markets as private actors that had borrowed dollars scrambled to find dollars to repay 
their debts. The US – and international financial institutions where the US continues to have a lot of 
influence – helped meet that demand. The Fed, not China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 
acted as the world’s dollar lender of last resort. In the third quarter, the US government provided more 
financing to the rest of the world – through the Fed’s large dollar loans to European central banks that 
needed access to dollars to help their own banks – than it received. That pattern continued in the fourth 
quarter.  
This isn’t an argument that the crisis has been good to the United States. It clearly hasn’t. The fiscal 
cost of the financial bail-out – and the fiscal cost of a necessary Keynesian stimulus to counter a 
stunning contraction in private demand – will add to the United States’ stock of public debt. The 
burden of that debt is a limit on the United States long-run ability to project power abroad.  
At the same time, a continuation of the trends that existed prior to the crisis would not have worked to 
the United States’ advantage. During the course of this decade, the coffers of a set of countries that in 
                                                      
5  Financial Times, “An Ottoman warning for America, by Niall Ferguson, 2 January 2008 
(http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3679558-b8d4-11dc-893b-0000779fd2ac.html). 12 | BRAD SETSER 
general didn’t fully share US strategic goals were growing – and the US increasingly came to rely on 
the governments of countries that were neither democracies nor US allies for financing. The 
intensification of the crisis in autumn 2008 reduced the funds available to the governments of these 
countries – oil fell, and ‘speculative’ outflows reduced China’s reserve growth. It also reduced the 
United States’ trade deficit – and therefore the United States’ need for financing from abroad. In this 
respect, it reduced – at least temporarily – a key US strategic vulnerability. 
The oil-exporters: Russia and the Gulf 
In 2008, Russia needed $70 oil – and comparably priced natural gas – to cover its imports. Oil 
averaged close to $100, though obviously it was much higher in the middle of the year and much 
lower in the fourth quarter. When oil was high Russia – like many other oil exporters – received 
substantial capital inflows. Until the middle of 2008, Russia’s private firms and banks were building 
up external dollar and euro debt almost as rapidly as Russia’s government was building up its external 
reserves. 
This changed last autumn. Oil fell sharply. Capital started flowing out of Russia even faster than it 
flowed in during the boom. The change in Russia’s financial and strategic position over the past 12 
months has consequently been extreme. The first phase of the financial crisis was marked by a huge 
rise in oil prices that worked to Russia’s advantage. The second stage of the financial crisis, by 
contrast, has been marked by a large fall in oil prices and a collapse of private capital flows to 
emerging economies. Russia’s reserves fell from close to $600 billion to under $400 billion in record 
time.  
The crisis has had three effects: 
-  The government of Russia’s oil and gas revenues no longer generate the funds needed to cover the 
government’s spending commitments; it is consequently currently drawing on the fiscal 
stabilisation fund to cover a large fiscal deficit. 
-  Russian banks and firms – whether private, state-owned or owned by friends of the state – cannot 
refinance their maturing external debts, let alone finance rapid growth with new credit. Russia 
consequently has relied on its foreign exchange reserves and the foreign exchange that was slotted 
for its incipient sovereign wealth fund to cover the external debts of Russian banks and companies. 
This has kept Russian companies in Russian hands rather than handing them over to (generally) 
Western bank creditors, but it also has contributed to a rapid depletion of Russia’s reserves.  
-  Russians themselves have gone from betting on the ruble to betting against the ruble. Dollars 
under the mattress that turned into rubles in the banks at the peak of the boom are once again 
returning to the mattress. The ruble has already fallen significantly against Russia’s euro-dollar 
basket – and it remains under pressure. 
A year ago, Russia looked to be a financial rock – with enormous and growing reserves and a large 
external surplus. It had plenty of funds to spread around, and growing external confidence. Then Prime 
Minister Medvedev was talking of the ruble’s eventual emergence as a global reserve currency at 
Russia’s own version of Davos.
6 Russia’s strategic interests in Georgia likely meant it would have 
intervened no matter what its financial position. At the same time, Russia’s $600 billion in assets 
seemed to guarantee that Russia didn’t have to worry too much about the impact of its foreign policy 
choices on its currency or its finances.  
                                                      
6 “We think the ruble could potentially aspire – as a freely convertible currency – to the role of a reserve 
currency to service transactions in those countries which are part of the ruble zone, which use the ruble for 
payments. We have yet to take a number of steps, in particular, to transfer trade in energy supplies into rubles, 
but in general I think this is an absolutely achievable task, it is interesting for Russia and for the CIS 
governments, but, in my view, it is also of interest to the entire outer world, because it can create a system based 
on using several reserve currencies.” (http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL2450096420080625). STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 13 
Today, Russia will need to accept large (and painful) policy shifts to reduce the drain on its reserves. 
Shedding $100 billion of reserves a quarter simply isn’t sustainable. Without policy change, Russia 
risks putting itself back in a position where it relies on external financial support. It is hard to believe 
that in October Iceland was exploring whether Russia might supply it with emergency financing on 
better terms than the IMF. Russia is still willing to deploy its reserves to support major strategic 
priorities – drawing Ukraine back into its fold, for example. But it has to make choices now that it 
could avoid when its financial resources seemed virtually unlimited. Some Russian oligarchs aren’t 
going to be bailed out, for example. 
The oil-exporting economies in the Gulf are in a similar – though less dire – position.  
The Gulf countries are in aggregate net lenders to the world. When oil was high, the governments of 
all the large oil exporters were building up large central bank reserves or adding large sums to their 
sovereign funds. However, the aggregate data was driven by the funds the Gulf’s governments 
invested abroad. At the same time as the Gulf’s governments were building up large foreign assets, 
many private banks and firms were borrowing large sums from abroad. Many Gulf banks in particular 
came to rely on external deposits to finance very rapid loan growth. The UAE’s debt to international 
banks that report data to the BIS rose from a little over $30 billion in 2005 to $110 billion in the 
middle of 2008. That total leaves out a host of intra-regional debts. It also overstates the distinction 
between ‘public’ external assets and ‘private’ external debts, as many ‘private borrowers’ are closely 
connected to the ‘palace’.  
The global economic crisis has made it impossible for many borrowers in the Gulf to refinance their 
external debts even as the fall in global stock markets have cut into the value of the foreign investment 
portfolio of many Gulf sovereign funds. Sovereign funds consequently feel squeezed on both sides. 
They are being called on to finance domestic bail-outs just when the value of their external portfolio 
hit a nadir. 
Moreover, the average oil price the Gulf States need to cover their import bill – and their budgets – 
rose during the boom. Most Gulf States now need roughly $50 billion oil to pay for their imports. The 
region’s public investment boom – and the ongoing expansion of government budgets – can only be 
sustained if the region dips into its existing external assets to meet a host of domestic needs. The 
viability of many of the region’s more ambitious internal development projects – and a fair amount of 
Dubai real estate – is in question.  
The Gulf countries’ financial position isn’t as dire as Russia’s financial position: the Gulf countries 
‘break-even’ oil price is lower and their (combined) external assets are larger. Saudi Arabia was more 
conservative than many of the smaller Gulf countries and is consequently in better shape. But the 
region is also no longer flush. The Gulf’s losses from the fall in global equity markets probably offset 
the roughly $300 billion windfall the Gulf received from $100 a barrel oil in 2008. And in 2009, the 
Gulf will almost certainly run current account deficits for the first time in a long time.  
China: the wounded financial giant 
A crisis marked by a shortage of dollar liquidity would seemingly work to the advantage of the 
government of the country with by far the world’s largest dollar reserves. China reports $1.95 trillion 
in reserves – and its true reserves, counting the dollars stashed in the state banks and the cash held at 
the China investment Corporation – top $2.3 trillion. About $1 trillion of that has been invested in US 
treasuries and another $600 billion or so in the debt of Fannie, Freddie and the other US government 
sponsored ‘agencies’. Counting its modest equity investments and corporate bonds, China’s total US 
portfolio likely exceeds $1.7 trillion.  
The foreign assets now controlled by China’s State council are, put simply, staggering. A few 
examples. Before the disruption of the fourth quarter of 2008, China’s reserves were growing at a 
$600 to $700 billion annual clip – faster than the reserves and sovereign funds of all the oil-exporters 
combined. China’s non-dollar reserve portfolio would top the total reserves of all countries but Japan. 
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China’s large current account surplus and minimal external debt give it great potential freedom to use 
its reserves creatively. China is one of only a handful of countries that could lend out $100 billion (or 
more) of its reserves without worrying that it might find itself short of reserves.  
However, China hasn’t been willing to use its reserves to extend its influence during the crisis. It has 
rebuffed most bilateral pleas for help. China did provide backstop financing for Korea through a 
network of swaps among Asia’s central banks – in part because the weakness of Korea’s won was a 
threat to China’s exports and in part because it could do so through a cooperative regional framework 
alongside Japan. But it wasn’t willing to offer Pakistan financing to prevent Pakistan from going to the 
IMF. Nor has China been keen to use its resources to help private firms that are short of capital and 
liquidity. After getting burned on its investment in Morgan Stanley, China’s sovereign fund has 
repeatedly turned down requests from Western banks. And China, unlike Japan, hasn’t been willing to 
provide the IMF with additional supplementary resources.  
This reluctance may reflect a desire on the part of China’s leadership not to disrupt the existing 
international system so long as the system – in China’s eyes – continues to evolve in ways that work to 
its long-term advantage. It could also reflect a reluctance on the part of China to assume the mantle of 
global financial leadership, whether on its own or through the world’s existing institutions for 
international financial cooperation. But it also likely reflects the political fallout from the financial 
losses China took on its initial investments in risky assets – along with China’s concerns about the 
safety of its large holdings of the debt of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
Put simply, China dipped into risky assets at the top of the market and then retreated from risk at the 
same time as the private financial system. Its quest to protect its portfolio from losses limited its ability 
to project financial power during the crisis. 
The overwhelming majority of China’s portfolio has been invested in safe government bonds (at least 
so long as the US doesn’t walk away from Fannie and Freddie). As a result, China’s portfolio has, in 
aggregate, performed far better than almost any other large investment portfolio. Only Japan – with a 
portfolio composed almost exclusively of Treasuries – has done better, as the crisis dramatically 
increased the market value of a portfolio of safe, liquid government bonds. However, Chinese politics 
has been dominated by the losses China took on the small share of its portfolio that was invested in 
risky assets in an effort to boost returns. In 2006 China began exploring new ways of managing its 
reserves to obtain higher returns. The state banks were allowed to borrow about $100 billion of 
China’s reserves in 2006 to invest abroad. And in 2007, China both created a new sovereign fund and 
allowed its long-time reserve manager (SAFE) to experiment with equities and other assets that carried 
a risk of losses. In aggregate, though, that meant that China was buying risky assets at the peak of the 
boom. China compounded that error with a string of specific bad bets: Chinese state banks took losses 
on their holdings of securities backed by subprime loans, the CIC took losses on its investment in the 
US private equity firm Blackstone and the US investment bank Morgan Stanley and a state investment 
company (CITIC) would have taken large losses from an investment in Bear Stearns if China’s 
regulators had approved the proposed deal. The CIC even has taken losses on its safe investments: it 
had $5 billion invested in the ‘Reserve Primary Fund’, an American money market fund that ‘broke 
the buck’ after investing in Lehman paper.  
China responded to these losses – and concerns about the financial health of the Agencies – by shifting 
its portfolio toward the safest, most liquid bonds around: short-term Treasury bills. It likely bought 
close to $200 billion of bills in the fourth quarter alone. By running to the most liquid Treasuries 
during a liquidity crisis, China protected itself from taking credit losses (it obviously remains exposed 
to large moves in the dollar). But its quest for safety also limited its ability to act as an emergency 
source of liquidity, and thus its political influence. The Federal Reserve – which sold its Treasuries to 
take on the risky assets that the markets were selling – emerged as the key actor stabilising a host of 
US and global markets. The Fed ended up lending $600 billion to European central banks that needed 
dollars to help their own banks and stabilising the Agency market by indicating it would buy what 
China was selling.  STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 15 
The crisis has had a second impact on China: it has contributed to a sharp downturn in domestic 
economic activity and thus prompted China’s policy-makers to focus on putting in place policies to 
limit the domestic downturn. China’s downturn isn’t totally a product of the global slump. China’s 
property sector started to cool in the summer of 2008 – before the ‘Lehman’ crisis. The net result 
though is that one of the domestic engines of China’s growth has stalled even as a sharp contraction in 
US and European demand has cut into the external demand for China’s exports. China’s exports were 
up 20% (y/y) in September. They were down 3% in December. And China’s imports were down 20% 
(y/y). The latest data suggests that China’s economy stalled in the fourth quarter of 2008. While that is 
better than the outright decline most other large economies experienced, it represents an enormous 
deceleration from the fast growth China enjoyed until recently.  
China’s leadership consequently seems to have defined its international objectives in a defensive way: 
it wants to avoid international commitments that might limit China’s domestic freedom of action. For 
example, it has vetoed any international discussion of its exchange rate regime. It hasn’t pushed to join 
other international groupings out of concern that membership would create pressure for China to give 
global concerns more weight in its economic decision-making. China’s latent international financial 
power consequently hasn’t been tapped. 
Europe 
Setting Britain – which has all of the United States financial weaknesses and few of its strengths – 
aside, the impact of the crisis on Europe has been ambiguous. 
The first phase of the crisis was marked by the euro’s strength and relatively strong European growth. 
Indeed, European growth has exceeded US growth – after adjusting for US population growth – for 
most of this decade. It far exceeded US growth in 2007 and 2008. During this period the EU was the 
engine of global demand growth, with the EU’s growing current deficit increasingly offsetting the 
emerging world’s current account surplus. Housing and consumption bubbles in many countries on 
Europe’s southern (Spain, Portugal), eastern (From the Baltics down to Bulgaria) and western (Ireland, 
UK) periphery fuelled its growth. European banks played a key role channelling funds from high 
savings countries at Europe’s core – and the inflows associated with global demand for euro reserves – 
to the fast-growing countries on the periphery. Strong growth in Asia’s exports to Europe sustained 
Asian export growth even as the United States non-oil deficit contracted. Conversely, the strong euro 
was creating serious difficulties for key European industries (aircraft most obviously). Much of the 
financing for the EU’s aggregate current account deficit and Europe’s global investment came from 
the emerging world’s growing holdings of euro reserves.  
In many ways, Europe was stepping into the role of the United States had previously played in the 
global economic system. The combination of euro strength and dollar weakness was creating 
incentives that were shifting the world’s macroeconomic imbalances from the US to Europe, as 
Europe’s deficit increasingly offset the surplus in Asia and the oil-exporting economies.  
The second stage of the crisis, by contrast, has been marked by the spread of the financial crisis to 
Europe, with the losses European banks incurred on their US book triggering a broad contraction in all 
lending. Banks in countries with domestic real estate booms – notably the UK, Ireland and Spain – are 
facing additional domestic losses. Their losses at home in turn have led eurozone (and Swedish) banks 
to scale back their lending to Eastern Europe.  
In effect, Europe – taken as a whole – is currently facing four interlinked financial crises. First, a host 
of European banks that previously had borrowed in dollars in the wholesale market to finance bets on 
risky US bonds have lost access to dollar financing. This liquidity shortage was addressed by the Fed’s 
swap lines with the ECB, the Bank of England, the Swiss National Bank, Sweden’s Riksbank and 
others. This allowed Europe’s central banks to function as dollar lenders of last resort for the 
institutions they supervise. Second, a number of European banks have taken large losses at home and 
abroad. They, like their American counterparts, are effectively insolvent and in need of large scale 
equity injections. Third, the banks in Europe’s core have dramatically scaled back lending to banks 
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Fourth, the economic slump, the cost of the financial bailout and a repricing of risk across a host of 
markets has increased the borrowing costs of some of Europe’s weaker governments. New York and 
North Carolina aren’t being asked to pick up the cost of bailing out ‘their’ financial institutions; 
European countries with large banks sometimes are. 
The resulting crisis is testing Europe’s collective institutions for crisis management. The ability of 
Europe’s nations and institutions to rise to this challenge will likely determine whether the crisis 
strengthens or weakens Europe’s strategic position. This is most obvious with the crisis on Europe’s 
eastern periphery. 
In many ways, ‘Europe’ created a successful model for integrating the poorer countries in the East into 
Europe’s industrial and political core. The perceived protection offered by membership in the 
European Union created a portion of the world where capital was flowing in the direction most 
expected: the wealthier parts of Europe were financing high levels of investment in poor countries, 
with rapid growth in the periphery in turn creating strong demand for the exports of many countries in 
Europe’s core. The contrast with the Pacific – where poor Asian savers financed wealthy American 
consumers – is obvious. 
However, this model clearly got taken a bit too far. Many countries in Eastern Europe were running 
current account deficits of over 10% of their GDP. Many households and firms in the East were 
borrowing in euros, effectively betting that their local currencies wouldn’t depreciate against the euro. 
The result: many countries in Eastern Europe were vulnerable to an interruption in financial flows. 
The scale of the financing needs in many Eastern European countries though are so large that they 
cannot easily be met even with IMF’s loans of the size provided to Mexico in 95. Hungary’s IMF 
programme was supplemented with additional financing from the European Central Bank. Iceland’s 
programme was augmented by additional financing from the Nordic countries and the UK. 
The current crisis is consequently testing Europe’s collective institutions for financial crisis 
management – particularly if the IMF is counted as part of ‘Europe’s’ institutional infrastructure. 
Remember, European countries are heavily over-represented on the IMF’s board – and with most IMF 
lending to European countries, it is quickly morphing into the European monetary fund. A successful 
response would augment Europe’s strategic position; Europe would have demonstrated its capacity to 
manage a crisis in its own backyard – and laid the foundation for a European financial order that is 
less dysfunctional than the current global financial system. Capital could continue to flow downhill, to 
Europe’s periphery and in the process facilitate the expansion of Europe’s zone of democratic 
prosperity. Capital would just flow into the countries on Europe’s periphery at a more subdued pace.  
Conclusions 
The United States’ most serious financial crisis since the Depression has led, surprisingly, to a rally in 
the dollar. The crisis coincided with an enormous reversal in global capital flows. All the trends of the 
past several years – whether large private capital flows to the emerging world that financed stunning 
growth in the emerging world’s reserves or huge two ways through London as the shadow financial 
system expanded – have gone into reverse. The United States unique ability to create dollars – and its 
ongoing ability to borrow in its own currency – reasserted itself as a key strategic asset. A host of 
countries had to turn to the US, Europe and the IMF for financing, reviving a traditional avenue for 
American influence. Falling oil prices dramatically reduced the United States reliance on non-
democratic governments for financing. The direct strategic consequences of oil’s fall from $140 a 
barrel to $40 a barrel likely exceed the direct strategic impact of the financial crisis. In the second half 
of 2008, the United States government even became a net lender to the rest of the world (through the 
Fed’s swap lines). The net effect was an improvement in America’s international financial position – 
at least if that position is defined by the US need for financing from potential geostrategic rivals – 
even as the global appeal of the American model of capitalism fell.  
Over time, the countries – and regions – that are most able to pull themselves out of the current slump 
will emerge in a stronger position than those countries that cannot. But even here the analysis is 
ambiguous: key countries are – appropriately – relying on government spending and tax cuts to STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS | 17 
stimulate their economies. That – plus the cost of various bank bailouts – will add dramatically to the 
stock of public debt that will eventually need to be offset by higher taxes or reduced spending. The 
governments of countries that entered into the crisis with a stronger initial fiscal position will 
consequently emerge from the crisis in a stronger financial position. They may also end up in a 
stronger strategic position if the financial world shifts from worrying about the risk that a bank will 
fail to the risk that a government will fail to pay its debt. The core balance then, as always, is between 
taking on more debt to spur a recovery and the long-term costs of additional debt.   
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Russia and world recession 
Fyodor Lukyanov
1 
The former Prime Minister of Belgium, Guy Verhofstadt wrote that: 
2008 may well go down in history as a pivotal year: like 1989, when the Berlin Wall fell and 
the Iron Curtain was torn down; 1944-1945, when World War II ended, the United Nations 
was founded and the Bretton Woods Agreements signed, and when two new superpowers 
embarked on a fanatical race for supremacy; or 1919, 1815 or 1648 – the years, respectively, 
of the Treaty of Versailles, the Congress of Vienna and the Peace of Westphalia. All 
momentous events that marked the end of an era and at the same time heralded a new epoch 
in human history.
2 
There is no country left in the world that has not been affected by the general economic recession. All 
countries suffer from the same root cause of this disease (that is, an imbalance in the global economy, 
which stems from ‘blowing bubbles’). But the specific diagnoses, the way in which the disease runs its 
course, and the treatment methods are different everywhere. Economies pegged to natural resources 
(Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Arab countries, and Venezuela) are suffering from the crisis in one way; 
export-oriented countries (China and other Asian states) in another way; and advanced industrial 
countries in yet another.  
The nature of the changes and a new global alignment of forces will depend on how much the leading 
world actors have been affected by economic problems and, therefore, on the extent to which they will 
retain the ability to implement their international agenda. Most likely, everyone will have to be more 
economical, rethink their ambitions, and set priorities more clearly: what is imperative; what is 
desirable; and what is not necessary at all. This concerns every international player, but in the case of 
Russia the contrast between the ambitions declared just a few months ago and the real opportunities 
available today is especially striking. 
New position of Russia 
The crisis has drastically changed the trend in Russia’s political and economic development. 
Almost throughout Vladimir Putin’s rule (from August 1999 when he was appointed prime minister to 
the autumn of 2008), the country was in a state of automatic growth. In other words, whatever the 
authorities did, the economic situation kept improving. At first, this phenomenon was due to the effect 
of a sharp devaluation of the ruble in 1998, and then it stemmed from the growth of oil prices, which 
since 2003 turned into a real hydrocarbon boom. Measures to centralise economic management gave 
the government additional opportunities to consolidate its own positions. 
The beginning of the global recession has put Russia in a situation of automatic decline: whatever the 
government does, the situation continues to deteriorate. All the talk in recent years about the Russian 
economy reducing its dependence on the raw materials sector has proved to be illusory. The 
dependence of the Russian economy on the external market environment has turned out to be all but 
absolute, and this applies both to the state in general and to the largest Russian corporations. The lack 
of an investment resource and the need for drastic cuts in spending at all levels have become obvious. 
The political model established in Russia since last spring has no parallel in history. The ruling 
tandem, intended to symbolise continuity and innovation at the same time, was planned for an entirely 
different economic situation. In the conditions of stability, it did not really matter that the powers and 
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responsibilities between the president and the government were blurred, as the two offices were one 
ruling conglomerate with a vague division of duties. However, the crisis dictates greater certainty, at 
least when it comes to responsibility. 
Objective conditions are arising for the emergence of differences between the participants in the ruling 
tandem, although the existence of prerequisites does not necessarily mean that they will develop into a 
full-blown conflict. Ties between the president and the prime minister are so close that it would take 
the accumulation of very serious discord to bring about a rift in the present model. It must be borne in 
mind that Vladimir Putin personally was (and largely remains) the only source of legitimacy of 
President Medvedev. Without him, Dmitry Medvedev could not even dream of the position he now 
occupies. The awareness of this, coupled with a high degree of personal loyalty developed over many 
years of working together, will prevent the president from initiating a conflict. 
At the same time, the agenda of efforts to solve the economic problem is objectively more associated 
with the public image of Dmitry Medvedev than that of Vladimir Putin. Putin is a ‘man of war’, whom 
the public associates, above all, with the notion of security – national and personal. The population 
trusts Putin in these matters. Medvedev has from the very beginning positioned himself as a statesman 
who cares about quality of life, that is, with a more ‘human’ dimension. It is precisely the latter that 
concerns society today, and this factor enables the president to assert himself more often and more and 
more convincingly. 
It is very difficult to assess the real potential of social discontent. According to the Levada Center, the 
most influential independent sociological agency, the Social Sentiment Index (ISN) decreased by 17% 
in December 2008 from September, or by 21% from the record high level of the ISN in March 2008. 
These rates are comparable to the peak of decline in social sentiments in September 1998, immediately 
after the financial collapse and the announcement of default.
3 Interestingly, 69% of the population 
believes that the crisis had been brewing for a long time.
4 This contradicts the official position that the 
successful development of Russia has fallen victim to external factors, above all the crisis in the US. 
Nevertheless, there have been no serious manifestations of social discontent in the country so far. The 
only instance that attracted international attention took place in Vladivostok on 14 December 2008, 
when police violently broke up a protest against the government’s plans to raise tariffs on imported 
used cars. It must be borne in mind, however, that that region is the most criminalised part of the 
country and that the business of importing used cars from Japan is controlled by organised criminal 
gangs, which had a role in organising the protests. However, the events sparked such a widespread 
negative social reaction that police preferred not to intervene in subsequent protests in Vladivostok. 
The experience of the 1990s has demonstrated that Russian society has a high level of adaptability. 
Citizens focus their efforts, first of all, on adapting to ongoing negative processes, rather than on 
trying to change them by influencing the government. 
At the same time one important aspect should be noted. Previous periods of Russian development 
were based on a kind of social contract: stability and improved living standards for the population in 
exchange for increased political rights for citizens. This principle can no longer be regarded as 
effective. 
Meanwhile, the actions taken by the authorities reveal their growing concern about the situation, 
evident in the tone of official statements and personnel decisions. For example, President Medvedev 
began a purge of governors in February, after he previously lashed out at regional authorities for their 
inability to cope with the crisis. The way the authorities have been devaluing the ruble shows the 
extent to which the authorities are concerned about public reaction to the developments in the country: 
the first stage of the devaluation extended from November to February. The majority of economists 
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insist that the ruble should have been devalued at once, which would have been more effective and 
saved considerable hard currency resources for the Central Bank. However, President Medvedev 
defended the stage-by-stage tactic in a recent interview: 
In my view what is most important is that the weakening of the ruble was gradual, which was 
totally unlike the barbaric way that this was done in 1998 when people’s wallets, in fact 
everyone’s wallets, suddenly slimmed down by 300%, and this wave swept over everyone 
and it was very unpleasant. In this case, the drop in value that has occurred, something of the 
order of 30-35%, was handled with great care. And virtually all the participants in our 
economic dealings, our citizens and our businesses, were able to choose for themselves a 
sensible strategy for dealing with their savings in rubles... Some economists did recommend a 
rapid devaluation. According to certain economic models this presumably makes sense, but it 
could have a devastating effect on millions of our people and our companies.
5 
This humane approach, which really let the population, banks and businesses convert their savings into 
foreign currencies, cost the Central Bank of Russia dearly. The bank’s international reserves have 
decreased by 209,672 billion dollars, or by 35.1%, from 1 August 2008, when these reserves stood at 
596,566 billion dollars. This does not mean that the reserves will continue to be spent at the same rate 
– the authorities will obviously be much more cautious with spending. The current balance of payment 
has now been brought back to normal, and if oil prices stop falling, the ruble rate will be maintained at 
approximately the present level. 
Russia managed to avoid major problems in the banking sector, nothing like the big bankruptcies in 
the US and EU member states took place in Russian banks. But the real economy has been greatly 
affected; Russia’s GDP decline in January 2009 compared to January 2008 was 8.1%.  
Economist Sergei Alexashenko writes that: 
by the end of last year, the sum of accumulated and unfunded anti-crisis promises amounted 
to about 7 trillion rubles (200 billion dollars, or three-quarters of the 2009 federal budget), 
which exceeded the size of the Reserve Fund by 50%. If we add to this the reduction of 
federal budget revenues from the planned figures, which is estimated at 3.5-4 trillion rubles 
this year, it becomes clear that the government has lost control over the growth of its spending 
promises, while the implementation of all these plans will put the country on the brink of a 
macroeconomic collapse.
6 
Experts agree, however, that cuts in spending, including cuts to social programmes, are inevitable, 
although the authorities are studiously avoiding using the term ‘budget sequestration’. 
Much will depend on the scale of support that the government will give to large state-owned and 
private enterprises that have found themselves on the brink of bankruptcy. Alexashenko warns that 
if the government wants to retain control over the macroeconomic situation, it will have to 
limit the ‘size of the pie’ to be divided; that is, it will have to declare the maximum amount of 
expenses that it is ready to fund within the framework of anti-crisis efforts.
7 
Limiting the size of the pie may increase tensions within the elite, as groups of discontented will 
inevitably emerge. Since many large corporations will have to pay large debts to foreign creditors, the 
government will have to decide what industries and what owners should be saved and what industries 
could be ceded to repay the debts. Discussions about the protection of ‘strategic industries’, which 
have been continuing in the last few years, are now acquiring a new content. 
On the whole, the impact of the crisis on the situation in Russia can be summarised as follows: 
                                                      
5 http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/02/15/1110_type82916_212924.shtml  
6 http://www.vremya.ru/2009/21/4/222632.html  
7 Ibid. RUSSIA AND WORLD RECESSION | 21 
•  The crisis has revealed the ineffectiveness of the existing economic model based, as before, almost 
entirely on raw materials and dependent on the world market environment and external sources of 
finance (foreign investment and corporate borrowings); 
•  Two structural problems of the Russian economy – corruption and monopolisation – are growing 
from acute to fatal in the crisis conditions; 
•  There emerge prerequisites for contradictions within the ruling elite due to the vague distribution 
of powers and responsibilities, to the emergence of interest groups deprived of their share of 
governmental support for businesses, and to the imbalance in economic and security agendas in 
favour of economic issues; 
•  There is a need for structural reforms, privatisation and the opening of the economy to attract 
domestic and foreign financial resources. Although there is a ‘mobilisation’ element in Russian 
discussions (calls for isolationism, self-reliance, and for fencing the country off from the global 
processes), it remains marginal and, on the whole, has no influence on political or economic 
decision-making; 
•  The potential for social discontent is not obvious yet – despite the deepening decline, the situation 
remains under control, and the authorities may launch ‘managed liberalisation’ in order to let off 
steam and reduce tensions. The government still has substantial financial resources that can 
alleviate the most acute problems. 
Changes in the world situation 
The economic crisis has affected the overall alignment of forces in the world arena. Yet rather than 
change the political reality drastically it has revealed processes that have been in latent development 
for a long time. 
The United States is past the peak of its global influence, and this did not happen last autumn. It 
became clear after the Iraqi campaign that the US lacked the strength for hegemony or, most likely, 
that hegemony in principle is impossible in the modern world. 
The relative decline of the United States (in absolute terms it will remain an actor beyond compare for 
a few more decades) will be accompanied by changes in tactics. Barack Obama declared that he would 
assign the key role to multilateral cooperation and international institutions back at the early stage of 
his election campaign.
8 The crisis and the need to economise resources make the problem of ‘burden-
sharing’ especially important. 
In practice, this means that the US will seek to build up ‘soft power’ (in Obama’s style) and 
opportunities for indirect influence, and will take a more flexible position on alliances. Washington 
will certainly try to strengthen its ties with Europe as its traditional and closest partner. 
Simultaneously, however, it will set its eyes on Asia, rightly believing that the ‘old world’ is losing its 
central position in the global system. The US may also place more emphasis on Africa and Latin 
America – partly because of Obama’s African roots, and partly because the role of these continents 
will keep growing, at least for demographic and resource reasons. 
Trans-Atlantic unity rests on the solid foundation of extensive economic ties, mutual investment, 
cultural and historical community, and traditional allied relations, which became particularly strong in 
the Cold War years. 
At the same time, the focus of Washington’s economic attention is gradually moving towards Asia, as 
has just been confirmed by the crisis, which has once again demonstrated how much the US and China 
depend on each other. As regards the ‘strategic horizons’ of the two shores of the Atlantic, they are 
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diverging somewhat. America has not given up its global leadership ambitions and expects real 
support for its efforts from Europe. The old world is not ready to participate in Washington’s 
geopolitical projects around the globe. This unreadiness was evident in previous years, and the crisis 
will most likely only consolidate this approach. 
A possible loss in status of the privileged partner of the US would put Europe in an unusual position. 
On the one hand, the leading European nations have long wanted to move out from the US umbrella 
and play an independent role in world politics. On the other hand, Europeans have long been out of the 
habit of playing such a role; not a single EU country can play it on its own, whereas the EU as a whole 
is unable to work out a common policy due to its heterogeneity, even though this organisation has 
great potential. In addition, the US has enough levers to neutralise any attempts by the EU to get out of 
control, if ever they are made. 
By appealing to shared values and historical commonality with Europe, the United States is trying to 
involve the ‘old world’ in its efforts to strengthen its global positions, but there is a conceptual 
contradiction here. In remote regions (Central Eurasia, and South and East Asia), Europe is not ready 
to sacrifice its interests for the sake of its Atlantic ally. But as regards adjacent territories (the Middle 
East, North Africa, and part of the post-Soviet space), which the European Union includes in the 
sphere of its immediate interests, the EU and the US often turn out to be soft competitors there. 
Many analysts say that the crisis may result in regionalisation and the consolidation of individual 
centers of gravity, around which zones of economic growth will be formed. Guy Verhofstadt writes 
about the emergence of political and economic entities 
potentially made up of many states and peoples, united by common structures and modern 
institutions, often nourished by diverse traditions and values and rooted in old and new 
civilizations… What matters is the political stability and economic growth that they can create 
at a regional level, not for one or other of them to rule the whole world. In a nutshell, this is 
not about nostalgia for a return to the European empires of old but rather the birth of new 
types of political organizations, established by open and free societies, competing with each 
other at a global level, building bridges rather than walls, but each retaining its regional roots 
and customs.
9 
Most likely, it will be impossible to avoid a surge of protectionism while overcoming the crisis,
10 and 
markets will try to protect themselves. Therefore, the desire of each market for expansion is only 
natural. The most illustrative examples of this are the European Union and East and Southeast Asia, 
where China acts as the centre. Moscow, too, is now attracting visitors from neighbouring countries – 
it has turned out that there is no-one to ask for help except the former metropolitan country. Even 
‘rebellious’ Kiev has asked for loans. 
The latter case is indicative. It would seem that the European Union and the US must support Ukraine, 
because the geopolitical alignment of forces in the entire post-Soviet space depends on Ukraine’s 
future. The crisis limits the ability of even large powers to provide financial aid. The International 
Monetary Fund’s reserve is not great (250 billion dollars), yet it can still be used. The IMF has always 
served as an instrument for strengthening American leadership, because it conditioned its assistance on 
compliance with recommendations of the Washington Consensus. 
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But first, the founders of the Consensus themselves are now the main violators of these 
recommendations. Second, the economic and political position of Ukraine inspires no hope that Kiev 
will fulfil the terms set for it. One can now hear calls for flexibility in relation to principles: 
“Conditionality remains necessary over the long term, but with this crisis still unfolding, the IMF is 
rightly moving toward temporarily suspending it.”
11 However, this would make the structure on which 
the US-centric world was based – namely, a combination of ideological integrity, an attractive political 
image, and the ability to project military and economic strength – lose its rigidity and stability, 
especially now that lively discussions are being held in the world (albeit not backed by reality) about 
alternative development models. 
Of all great powers, the United States is the only one that in the coming decades will not be content 
with the status of a regional centre with its own sphere of influence. Europe, China, India, Russia, 
Brazil, Iran, South Africa, Japan and some other countries would be quite satisfied with such a status, 
(which does not mean that all the above-mentioned countries will be able to play such a role.) 
American hegemony is no longer possible. But the position of the only global force among many 
multi-sized regional forces may prove to be winning, although it would require sophisticated tactics. 
At the very least, this is a new situation. 
Russia – temptations and reality 
Russia is a natural centre of gravity for post-Soviet countries, because most of them are experiencing a 
severe economic decline and cannot count on support from other countries. Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, 
Belarus and Ukraine have already asked Moscow for help, in one way or another, and they are likely 
to be followed by other neighbouring countries. All spending planned by Russia, including the 
allocation of 7.5 billion dollars to the Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC), has already exceeded 11 billion dollars. This sum does not look critical yet, compared to 
the remaining total reserves; however, the dynamics of both internal and external spending will limit 
the temptation to strengthen the country’s geopolitical positions. 
Changes in the global economic situation will certainly affect the substance of Russia’s foreign policy. 
Moscow will have to match its desires and expectations with its reduced capabilities and to build a 
system of clear-cut priorities. In particular, it will have to decide what geopolitical projects must be 
implemented, what projects are of minor importance, and what projects can be given up. Obviously, 
Europe and Eurasia will remain Russia’s priority areas of interest in any situation, and the desire to 
play a leading role in international affairs will not disappear, even if the resources shrink, because this 
is in line with the aforementioned general tendency towards regionalisation. 
On the other hand, it is unlikely that last year’s ideas of consolidating Russian presence in the western 
hemisphere by establishing close ties with Venezuela, Cuba and Bolivia, will retain their priority. 
On the whole, the impact of the crisis on Russia’s foreign policy may have a dual nature. The need for 
investment in economic development will cause Russia to be more open in its relations with 
industrialised countries. At the same time, the aggravation of general competition, amidst growing 
protectionism and declining global governability, will increase the isolationist/anti-globalist 
sentiments that are already visible in Russian politics. 
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The lessons for China 
Lanxin Xiang
1 
China caught by surprise 
The financial crisis has caught the Chinese leadership by surprise. There are three reasons for the lack 
of psychological and policy preparation: first, over the years, the Chinese economy has become 
heavily reliant upon the export sector and an economic recession caused by the financial sector was 
not thought possible as long as consumer spending showed no sign of slowing down. The Washington 
Consensus created a bubble, but behind the bubble was real estate mortgage and subprime derivatives. 
China has little knowledge, let alone practice of this type of seemingly advanced financial market 
innovations in the United States. Hence, it was the backwardness of China’s banking system, and its 
failure to understand financial innovations, that saved China from falling deeply into the current crisis. 
Second, China has little knowledge and working experience in general of the Anglo-American 
monetary system, which has dominated the international financial scene since 1945. China was not 
part of the Bretton Woods system (for Taiwan had represented China in international organisations, 
including all UN institutions and the Security Council seat till 1971) until it collapsed in the 1970s. 
China hardly participated in any international financial cooperation and policy activities. After the 
Nixon Shock in 1972 when a floating exchange rate became a reality, the Chinese monetary system 
was not affected at all as long as the RMB was not convertible and trade volume was exceedingly 
small.  
Third, the current Chinese exchange rate regime was created during the 1997 financial crisis when its 
currency started pegging to the US dollar, but now the RMB is no longer immune from turbulences of 
the international financial system not only because of China’s holding of the largest dollar debt, but 
also because its heavy investment after the ‘Going-Out Strategy’ was launched at the beginning of the 
new century, especially in Latin America and Africa. 
The lessons from the 1997 financial crisis do not apply 
First, exchange rate pegging no longer works in coping with a sinking banking system in the West. 
China played a critical and responsible role during the 1997 financial crisis in East Asia, by holding its 
currency exchange rates steady to avoid competitive devaluations in the badly hit region. Since then, 
China thought that another financial crisis might come China’s way, but would not impact directly on 
China as it did during 1997. But such a judgement has proved wrong and the magic policy of 
exchange rate pegging has now become a liability rather than asset, since the fair trade issue is framed 
precisely in terms of currency manipulation, even though such a manipulation was not initially 
intended during the 1997 crisis.  
Second is the danger of the ‘new weapons of mass destruction’. The G2 structure, or US-China 
condominium, publicised by Niall Ferguson as “Chimerica” does not necessarily serve China’s 
national interest well. In the past three years, the China-US Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) has 
become important for the world's two most powerful countries, the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China, to discuss mutually related topics and try to avoid many misunderstandings. The 
SED was initiated in 2006 by President George W. Bush and President Hu Jintao. The format is such 
that top officials in charge of the economies of both countries would meet twice a year at locations 
alternating between China and the US. It has been described by a former US Treasury official as “sort 
of like the G2”. The Obama Administration decided to end such a dialogue, but at the same time 
elevates G2 to the level of summit meetings.  
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What the true objective is on the part of Washington remains to be seen, but one thing is certain: the 
US needs China’s help to overcome the domestic economic downturn. More specifically, the US 
definitely wants to reduce trade deficits and at the same time secure financial resources when 
expanding domestic spending through its huge stimulus plans. Since double deficits (trade and fiscal) 
have been a rather common practice in US history since the 1970s, the only way of pursuing this twin 
objective is to manipulate the international monetary system by printing money and attracting foreign 
buyers to increase or at least not decrease dollar holdings. This is what might be called ‘indirect 
imperial tax’ as compared with the direct tax levied by the Roman legions in ancient history. The 
friction between China and the US is therefore inevitable, as the US clearly aims to export ‘toxic 
assets’ to China through whatever means available and as Thomas Friedman said, by using toxic assets 
as the new weapon of mutually assured destruction, China will have no escape.  
The export-led model and the need for fundamental review  
Great trade dependency has now become China’s Achilles heel. China is the third largest economy in 
the world, China’s foreign trade dependency, defined as a country’s export-GDP ratio and share in 
total world exports, has increased considerably over the last two decades. In 1978, China’s exports 
constituted a mere 5% of its GDP; by 1998 that figure topped 20%. The country in 2006 registered an 
unwholesome trade-to-GDP ratio of 69%. In many cases the economies of large countries tend to have 
lower degrees of trade dependency because of large domestic production and consumption. But 
China’s trade dependency is already higher than that of the United States, Japan, India and Brazil, and 
a greater degree of trade dependency would result in an exodus of resources because of worsening 
trade terms. China now claims to be the world’s largest workshop. What needs to be understood is that 
China produces primarily for the international market rather than the domestic market. Export 
overproduction cannot be easily absorbed by the internal market.  
In fact, China’s greatest weakness in economic development is its foreign dependency. Under the so-
called East Asian development model, foreign funds and foreign economic relations are based on the 
economic theory of ‘comparative advantage’. According to this theory, a developing nation must 
export goods it can produce cheaper than other nations and import goods where it is at a disadvantage. 
Only in this way can it maximise the efficiency of the international division of labour and use it to the 
benefit of its own economic development. Because of its large economic and population scales, 
China’s growth momentum and excessive dependence on international markets is unparalleled in the 
economic history of the world. Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong have small-scale 
economies, so it is relatively easy for them to catch up with the world’s advanced standard of living. 
Some large economies, such as that of the US, also evolved from secondary developed nations into 
leading trading nations. But the US has a relatively stable domestic market with a relatively constant 
market demand. On the other hand, given the low wages of China's labourers, the purchasing power 
has remained low and consumption demand has not been able to meet the manufacturing supply.  
For two reasons, the comparative advantage model cannot be successful in China. On the one hand, 
China's single-minded pursuit of comparative advantage leads to over-production in some industries 
and, as a result, the goods it produces become too cheap. On the other hand, China does not have a 
mature domestic market to create the demand to sustain its economy. China’s goods must therefore be 
sold in overseas markets. China’s imports and exports represent such an immense share of world trade 
that its prices distort the world market. It should be noted that China has concentrated its import and 
export trade to a few countries and regions, namely the US, Japan, and the EU. These three account for 
around 50% of its total trade volume. So, any goods that China injects into these three markets will 
create pressure on local producers.  
As the communist leaders begin to consider downgrading manufacturing growth and export-led 
development strategy, the traditional measures based on GDP growth will become less emphasised. A 
Keynesian recipe will perhaps work better for China, given the fact that China badly needs to create a 
serious social welfare and health care system and revamp its entire education system. On the other 
hand, the long suppressed domestic consumer spending could be greatly stimulated if social welfare, 26 | LANXIN XIANG 
health care and education savings in most households could be released and directed towards housing 
and other consumer spending.  
China and the reform of the current international financial system 
The first priority for China before any meaningful reform is attempted should be a break away from 
dollar hegemony. 
China must cooperate with those who are willing to initiate serious reform of the international 
financial system. The Bretton Woods institutions are outdated. But there is no consensus as to what the 
international community could do next to reform the system.  
In breaking away from dollar hegemony, China has to regain real sovereignty in its central banking, 
because in a world order of sovereign nation states, the supranational nature of central banking has 
been used as an all-controlling device for the world's rich nations to neutralise the sovereign rights of 
financially weak nations. Even in a democratic world order, central banking is inoperative within 
national borders, as it can be used by a nation’s rich population as a device to deprive the working 
poor of their economic rights. Central banking, including the state-run system in China, has so far 
supported dollar hegemony, and operates, more often than not, internationally against the economic 
interests of sovereign nation states and domestically against the economic rights of the working poor 
by discrediting enlightened economic nationalism. 
To preserve dollar hegemony, exporting economies that accumulate large dollar reserves through trade 
surpluses are forced by the US to revalue their currencies upward, not to redress the trade imbalance, 
(which is the result of dysfunctional terms of trade rather than inoperative exchange rates), but to 
reduce the value, in foreign local currency terms, of US debt assumed at previously stronger dollar 
exchange rates.  
China is therefore stuck in a double dysfunctionality. The fall in exports is expected to accelerate as 
any quick or sharp recovery in the US economy is not on the horizon. But a falling exchange rate 
causes more domestic inflation from imports denominated in dollars; and rising domestic inflation 
adds pressure to a falling exchange rate in a downward spiral, preventing the yuan from rising against 
the dollar from market forces. That is the dysfunctionality of the yuan-dollar exchange rate regime in 
relation to the inflation rate differentials between the two economies, when the exchange rate is set by 
trade imbalance denominated in dollars. This problem is caused by the flawed attempt to use exchange 
rates to compensate for dysfunctional terms of trade, which has been mostly caused by wage disparity.  
Conclusion: Back to Keynes? 
In conclusion, China must reduce its foreign trade dependency ratio and drastically expand the 
domestic trade market. It must also reduce dollar debt holdings and encourage the euro to become a 
leading international, alternative reserve currency. Keynes had three beliefs that are still valid for 
China. First, he argued vehemently against over reliance on foreign trade, since no-one can predict 
market behaviour in the ‘long run’, no government can guarantee full employment. Second, he 
preferred a fixed international exchange rate system. If this cannot be realised, international 
cooperation is absolutely necessary to avoid currency wars. Third, accumulating foreign exchange 
reserve is not for hoarding but for spending and investment.  
The current Chinese policy of defending an 8% growth rate in 2009 is based on a flawed concept, as if 
China could spend itself out of its international dependency. There is no ‘scientific’ foundation for this 
growth rate. The only justification is China’s domestic political economy, as 8% is considered the 
bottom-line for preventing mass unemployment, which will destabilise its internal system. By publicly 
announcing this target, China will become even more vulnerable since international competitors could 
thus make policies aimed at either blackmailing China to make trade or monetary concessions, or 
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For the purpose of collaborating with the EU to overcome the current financial crisis, China has a vital 
stake in the EU’s success in passing the Lisbon Treaty and starting a serious CSFP. Despite current 
setbacks between China and its erstwhile best friend in Europe, France, the relations with other major 
EU players are dramatically improving. The new Sino-UK relationship is a good start, which is 
described by both London and Beijing as the ‘best’, especially in view of the UK’s position of 
officially recognising China’s sovereignty over Tibet. The recent publication of the British document: 
“The Framework of Engagement with China” marked a new beginning. This is after all the first 
British document regarding its strategies towards a particular country in modern times. Whether or not 
other countries in the EU could seize the same opportunity to elevate bilateral relations, remains to be 
seen.  
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The social consequences 
of the economic crisis 
Jørgen Mortensen
1 
Drivers of globalisation will weaken  
This working paper draws on an earlier study on the drivers of globalisation,
2 and considers how the 
current crisis may affect these trends. The discussion will follow the structure of Figure 1, below. 
Although the degree of weakening of the drivers of globalisation will only become clear as the 
depression unfolds, several of these drivers are set to slow down or be reversed.  
•  Trade liberalisation  is already taking several blows as a result of the emergence of certain 
measures to save ‘domestic’ financial institutions protect the automobile industry and certain sub-
contracting branches.  
•  EU enlargement and the process of integration would seem unlikely to slow down much but 
should certainly not be expected to accelerate except in one important area: the possible creation 
of an EU financial watchdog or an extension of the competences of the ECB with respect to 
financial surveillance and regulation.  
•  The costs and techniques of transportation may not be directly influenced by the financial crisis 
but in the short and medium term appear likely to be substantially reduced as a result of the 
lowering of demand and the present low oil prices. A number of cargo ships are already being laid 
up and more seem likely to follow. This will of course have severe knock-on effects on the 
shipyards.  
•  The liberalisation of capital movements and financial markets will no doubt slow down or be 
reversed as a result of the ongoing nationalisation of banks and other financial institutions, more 
intense scrutiny of many transactions and the enforcement of regulatory surveillance.  
•  The role of ICT and the internet as drivers of globalisation should not, it seems, be expected to 
weaken. In fact, a more active supervision of financial institutions and transactions would 
probably be facilitated by the internet. However, the internet and the expansion of mobile phones 
and the increasing scope for financial transactions via the latter will also promote the globalisation 
of terrorism and the drug trade.  
•  Migration policy and frontier control may on the whole become more restrictive both in the short 
and the medium term. However, as the incentives to migrate from poor to rich countries would 
seem likely to strengthen, the main effect of the depression will be a rise in illegal migration.  
•  The role and weight of multinationals in the world economy may not change significantly. 
However, an important question is whether the financial crisis and its economic consequences will 
bring about changes in international economic and financial governance. There would at present 
seem to be a certain movement in favour of assigning additional responsibility in the field of 
financial surveillance to the IMF and, within the EU, to the ECB. The nationalisation of parts of 
the financial services in several OECD countries will also result in a deeper involvement of 
governments in the running of key financial institutions and the financial crisis will per se result in 
changes in the perceptions and handling of financial risks.  
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The process of globalisation may slow down  
The direction and size of trade flows and maritime and inland transport have already weakened 
significantly and we cannot exclude more permanent repercussions for the structure, direction and 
level of trade flows and their associated transport services. Furthermore, there are good reasons to 
expect the financial crisis to have severe consequences for capital movements. In general the whole 
process of globalisation is therefore likely to slow down and possibly even be temporarily reversed.  
•  The direction, structure and size of trade flows have already been significantly influenced by the 
depression, but whether these changes are just temporary or of a more lasting nature remains to be 
seen. The principal factors having determined trade flows over the recent decades would seem 
likely to remain in force, with, however, the possibility that the liberalisation of trade may slow 
down or even be reversed at least for some ‘sensitive’ products, such as automobiles or steel. It 
may also become more difficult to continue the liberalisation of world trade.  
•  The outsourcing and insourcing of production, which has been part and parcel of globalisation 
during the last couple of decades is likely to slow down in response to new perceptions of risk and 
uncertainty.  
•  Whether migration will slow down as a result of the crisis remains to be seen. On one hand there 
are signs that a number of the most developed countries are taking steps to tighten rules or to adopt 
more selective policies for admitting economic migrants. Furthermore, at least in the short run 
there seems to be a tendency for migrant workers in Ireland and the UK to return to their home 
countries. On the other hand the crisis and the depression are now extending more broadly to the 
developing countries and the fundamental incentives to migration would seem unlikely to weaken, 
rather the contrary.  
•  The structure of trade in services could change as a result of a considerable slowdown in the size 
and pattern of capital movements but also as a result of a possible slowdown in maritime transport 
and aviation, etc.  
•  A huge increase in capital movements has been one of the dominant features of globalisation since 
1990 and there are good reasons to suppose that the size and flows of capital will be profoundly 
influenced by the financial crisis and associated depression. Net inflows of private capital, 
according to The Economist’s special feature on Globalisation (Feb. 7
th), have fallen to a fraction 
of the 2007 level. The perception of risks and uncertainties has been durably changed and the 
scope for the play of financial innovation severely reduced. Already investors and sovereign 
wealth funds have expressed increasing preference for government bonds and other instruments 
considered ‘safe’ but also an increasing tendency for spreads in favour of ‘prudent’ governments’ 
bonds to increase.  
•  While there is little doubt that the financial crisis and the decline in financial and non-financial 
activity will lead to a narrowing of the tax base in a number of countries, this would not 
necessarily lead to a more permanent change in the location of activity, with, of course, the 
exception of a general lowering of the tax base in the branches most directly involved in the 
financial crisis and the slowdown of activity, such as, notably, financial services and building and 
construction. Consequently, countries that have depended strongly on these branches may see a 
more permanent narrowing of their tax base.  
Social consequences  
The social consequences of the financial crisis and depression will not be uniformly and linearly 
dependent on the decline in activity. They will to a large extent depend on the basic features of the 
system of social protection and the capacity of the economy to avoid poverty traps and hysteresis.  
•  As the depression is largely caused by the sudden and dramatic drying up of the flow of credit, 
regions and branches that have benefitted most markedly from the enormous rise in credit and the 
decline in household saving in some countries will be the first to suffer. Whether this can be 30 | JØRGEN MORTENSEN 
expected to lead to an increase or, on the contrary, to a lowering of regional disparities can hardly 
be determined without an in-depth study of the regional patterns of growth in the different 
countries.  
•  The rise in income disparities since 1990 has probably only to a minor extent been caused by the 
explosion of financial services and credit and more to such fundamental factors as the increasing 
importance of knowledge and investment in education and human capital as the key determinants 
of life cycle income. Similarly, the failure of EU member states and other countries to reduce 
poverty rates cannot be assumed to have been caused by the expansion of credit and may therefore 
not be much influenced (in relative terms) by the depression. This, however, is a subject that 
merits deeper analysis.  
•  On the other hand there is no doubt that the rise in employment in a number of countries such as, 
the US, Spain, Ireland and the UK during the last couple of decades owes a lot to the boost in easy 
credit and therefore has been on an unsustainable path. The depression will therefore most likely 
lead not only to an increase in unemployment but also be followed by structural changes in 
employment.  
•  The failure of many countries to make progress with respect to social inclusion, and this despite 
declared objectives and policies, would not seem to have been caused mainly by the process of 
globalisation. However, in countries with a high degree of segmentation and fragmentation of the 
labour market (for example France and Italy) the ongoing decline in activity and the resulting rise 
in unemployment may lead to a new process of hysteresis (permanent exclusion from employment 
of the ‘outsiders’) and thus a significant weakening of the process of inclusion. Countries with a 
higher degree of mobility and flexibility in the labour market will also suffer a rise in 
unemployment but can be expected to recover more rapidly and without severe long-term 
consequences for the process of inclusion.  
Social policy recommendations  
The policy recommendations presented in the study on the social consequences of globalisation 
remain valid and in some countries the depression should in fact lead to a more rapid implementation 
of policies to promote flexibility and adaptability.  
•  In a number of countries the labour market position of low-skilled groups is likely to be 
significantly aggravated by the depression and the need for a strengthening of education and 
training is even more pressing than before the emergence of the financial crisis.  
•  Whereas the depression is leading to increasing public resistance to immigration and, in some 
countries, to a return of migrants to their home country, the need for measures to foster the 
integration of (accepted) immigrants would not in any way be reduced by the depression. The 
decline in activity and increase in unemployment, including unemployment among immigrants, 
will, if not met by policies to foster integration, result in new social tensions and the additional 
fragmentation of labour markets between insiders and outsiders.  
•  More generally, the need for enhancing labour market adaptability and flexibility will be even 
more urgent than before. The association of the financial crisis and depression will not only lead to 
a rise in unemployment but the recovery, once it is underway, will most probably involve 
structural changes and the relocation of activities and employment. Consequently governments 
would be well-advised to initiate new policies promoting adaptability.  
•  The likely acceleration of structural changes (including the strengthening of climate change 
mitigation and environmental protection) will require the additional adaptability of individuals so 
there is an added need to reshape social protection and enhance the empowerment and human 
capital endowment of individuals.  
•  Consequently the need to find new ways of managing social and individual risk is in no way 
reduced but actually becoming more urgent by the day.  THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS | 31 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the process of globalisation 
 